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Terrorism

Brenda Lutz and James Lutz

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Reader's Guide

This chapter analyses the threat that terrorism poses for countries and the world. Efforts to deal with terrorism can be considered within the framework of terrorism as warfare, terrorism as crime, and terrorism as disease. Which of these views is adopted often determines what kinds of counter-measures countries will use in their effort to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is a technique of action available to many different groups; security measures that work with one group may not be effective with others. As a consequence, dealing with terrorism in today's world can be a very complex process indeed.

Introduction

Terrorism has become an important phenomenon, as well as a major security issue for many countries. The attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington, DC highlighted the great damage that such attacks could cause. Since that time, large-scale attacks on tourist facilities

in Bali in 2002 and again in 2005, on the commuter trains in Madrid in 2004, on a Russian middle school in Beslan in 2004, the suicide bombings in London in 2005, the Christmas attacks in Mumbai in 2008, and the attack in Norway in 2011 by a lone gunman all demonstrate the continuing threat that terrorism can pose. Further, continuing terrorist campaigns that persist over time, such as the attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq

since the US invasion, have claimed many victims. It is not only the spectacular attacks that constitute a threat. The cumulative effects of such campaigns are important. Multiple attacks by a variety of dissident groups in Turkey between 1975 and 1980 left at least 5,000 dead and 15,000 injured (Bal and Laciner 2001: 106). This cumulative casualty toll is heavier than that sustained on 9/11. Such casualty lists have demonstrated the continuing vulnerability of people everywhere to terrorism, and more recently concern has grown that terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear).

While terrorism is a technique that has been around for millennia and used by different groups, the more pressing concern for governments today is the organizations that are currently threats. Groups have adapted to changing circumstances. During the Cold War, terrorist groups often gained the support of the Soviet Union or the United States or their respective allies. Today, there are no competing superpowers, and overt support for terrorist groups can generate a massive military response, as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan discovered. As a consequence, terrorist organizations have developed networks that provide mutual assistance. Groups like al-Qaeda in some respects have network structures (see Case Study 19.1). Other terrorist groups have also developed linkages with criminal organizations, especially those involved in drug trafficking. Both

the terrorists and the drug cartels benefit from weak governments that find it difficult to interfere with their activities. These loosely connected international networks can be more difficult to attack and defeat.

While terrorism and terrorists have been analysed from a variety of theoretical perspectives, one of the most useful has been proposed by Peter Sederberg (2003), who suggests that terrorism can be viewed from three perspectives. The first perspective is to think of terrorism in the context of an enemy to be defeated in war. The war analogy presumes that the use of military methods can be successful and that it is possible to achieve victory. A second perspective for dealing with terrorists is to rely on normal police techniques. The criminal analogy has two quite important implications. First, it suggests that terrorism, like crime, will not disappear; it can only be contained. Second, this approach is a reactive one—criminals are normally caught after they commit their crimes. The third perspective is to consider terrorism as a disease, emphasizing both symptoms and underlying causes. It assumes that there is a need for long-term strategies that address the basic causes, even if there can be successes along the way in treating symptoms. The three perspectives, of course, are not mutually exclusive, but they represent dominant ways in which terrorism is viewed. They are important for analysing the phenomenon and for government officials who make choices in terms of



CASE STUDY 19.1 Al-Qaeda and decentralized structures

Al-Qaeda (the Base) provides the most prominent contemporary example of a terrorist group organized as a network. Before 9/11 al-Qaeda had a core of planners and close associates of Osama bin Laden and groups in individual countries that cooperated with this central group. Al-Qaeda, in turn, often provided financial and technical assistance to national groups in Muslim countries, especially those opposed to more secular and pro-Western governments or those groups opposed to Western influences that come with globalization and modernization. Al-Qaeda was even willing to fund terrorist projects presented to it by local groups if they held the promise of success (Nedoroscik 2002). Cooperation such as this permitted the group to extend its reach. It provided technical and financial support for the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. It was much more centrally involved in the attacks on the US embassies in East Africa in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Once Afghanistan

was invaded, al-Qaeda maintained some of these network characteristics, but it also became a form of global leaderless resistance. Since 2002 the global jihadist movement has involved both network and leaderless resistance characteristics (Sageman 2008). The Madrid commuter train bombings of 2004, for example, involved participation by al-Qaeda agents. The London transit attacks in 2005 and probably the 2007 bombing attempt at Glasgow airport, on the other hand, were inspired by al-Qaeda, but they were undertaken independently by a local group of extremists who saw their attacks as part of the broader global jihad against the West. Attacks and failed attacks in the United States are examples as well. The death of Osama bin Laden, while a blow to the global jihad, will not cause a serious disruption to such a decentralized network of terrorist groups and individuals. The attacks will continue, and even in death bin Laden continues to serve as a symbol of the global jihad.

how to deal with terrorist activity. Which perspective is adopted will suggest mechanisms for dealing with terrorism. Before 9/11, authorities in the United States largely dealt with acts of terrorism from the criminal perspective. Terrorists were caught (although it took time in some cases) and brought to trial (although not always convicted). Normal police techniques, including the use of informers and the infiltration of agents into potentially dangerous groups (like the Ku Klux Klan in the United States in the 1960s), drew upon conventional practices. After 9/11, however, the war analogy became dominant for the administration of President Bush, and references to the global war on terrorism appeared regularly. Others have suggested reforms and policy changes to deal with the causes of terrorism, but that has never been the main strategy adopted by the United States. In Europe the crime analogy was also prevalent for many years. More recently there has been greater concern with addressing causes and trying to prevent the radicalization of individuals who might become recruits for terrorist groups.

KEY POINTS

- Terrorism was a problem long before the 9/11 attacks.
- Terrorism can be viewed as a problem to be resolved by military means (war on terrorism), by normal police techniques (terrorism as crime), or as a medical problem with underlying causes and symptoms (terrorism as disease).
- How terrorism is viewed will help to determine which policies governments adopt to deal with terrorism.

Concepts and definitions

There are a number of key concepts that are essential to any discussion of terrorism. The first is selecting a workable definition. A second concern involves targets and techniques, including the increasing concern about the danger that weapons of mass destruction present. A third key issue involves the prevalence of terrorism and the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, a distinction becoming more blurred with the passage of time. Finally, it is useful to distinguish among some basic types of terrorist groups, including ethnic, religious, and ideological.

Definition of terrorism

There has been a multitude of definitions used for terrorism, partially because of disagreements among commentators or analysts and partially because some definers seek to exclude groups that they support or to include groups that they wish to denounce. Courts and police agencies require definitions that permit prosecution and incarceration; political leaders may have different needs and agendas. A working definition that is relatively neutral recognizes the basic fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different kinds of groups. It includes six major elements. Terrorism involves (1) the use of violence or threat of violence (2) by an organized group (3) to achieve political objectives. The violence (4) is directed against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians. Further (5), while a government can be either the perpetrator of violence or the target, it is considered an act of terrorism only if one or both actors is not a government. Finally, (6) terrorism is a weapon of the weak (Lutz and Lutz 2008: 9).

This definition excludes kidnappings for financial gains and excludes acts by individuals, even those with political objectives. Organization is essential for a successful campaign to bring about the political goals that are being sought. While the exact political objectives vary, they can include changes in government policies or practices, changes in government leaders or structures, demands for regional autonomy or independence, or a mix of such political issues. Although organization is necessary for any chance of a successful campaign, individuals may operate in loose affiliation with a group. The individual dissidents may receive suggestions from leaders who maintain their distance from the operatives in the field in an organizational form that has come to be known as leaderless resistance. In such circumstances, individuals or small groups operate as part of a broader movement, even though they may not have direct links with a leadership. Groups as different as animal-rights organizations, the American militia movement, and global jihadists have relied on leaderless resistance tactics (Joose 2007). Anders Breivik, the Norwegian right-wing extremist who planted a bomb in Oslo and went on a shooting rampage against members of the youth wing of the Labour Party, saw himself as a soldier in the broader struggle against Muslim invaders of Europe and their local leftist, political allies.

Terrorism has a target audience that goes well beyond the immediate victims. Ultimately terrorist violence is a form of psychological warfare that undermines opposition to the terrorists' goals (Chalk 1996: 13). The violence generates fear in a target audience by attacking individuals who are representative of the larger group. This group can consist of members of the elite, supporters of the government, members of a particular ethnic or religious community, or the general public. Civilians are often chosen as targets, because they are more vulnerable than members of the security forces; furthermore, their deaths or injuries heighten the level of insecurity in the larger audience. It is often suggested that terrorist targets are chosen at random, but in fact terrorists usually pick their targets very carefully in order to influence an audience. The media often becomes important for this aspect of terrorism, since media coverage is very important for spreading fear, or at least in reaching the target audience more quickly, although target populations will usually become aware of attacks even when media attention is limited. Finally, terrorism is also a weapon utilized by the weak. Groups that can win elections or seize control of the government will do so; groups that cannot hope to win their objectives in other ways, however, may resort to terrorism.

Although terrorism can involve governments as targets or perpetrators, it does not include cases during cold and hot wars, even when governments use actions designed to instill terror. These government-to-government attacks are a different security issue and are not included in definitions of terrorism, even if they involve massacres, atrocities, or war crimes, or even genocide. Governments, however, are often the targets of dissident terrorists. While governments usually oppose terrorists attacking their citizens, at times political leaders may tolerate terrorist attacks by private groups against enemies, potential dissidents, or unpopular minorities (ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological). The government may fail to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of the violence. In other cases governments may provide active support and in extreme cases even form death squads to attack their enemies while maintaining at least an illusion of deniability. Even though this governmental involvement in terrorism is quite important, it will not be the focus of this chapter, since the violence does not begin as a security concern (although violent groups that are tolerated may later challenge the government, as occurred with the Fascists in Italy).

Techniques and targets

The range of techniques available to terrorists is varied, but most activities are variations of standard practices—bombings, kidnappings, assaults including assassinations, and takeovers of buildings, planes, or ships, invariably with hostages. Bombs can be used to damage property or in efforts to inflict casualties, sometimes in large numbers. Car bombs have increasingly become a favourite device for terrorist groups because of the damage that they can do. Kidnapping frequently provides a publicity bonanza for terrorist groups. In some cases ransoms from kidnappings have provided an important source of funding for terrorist organizations, and in other cases terrorists have been able to gain some concessions from governments in return for the release of the victims. Assaults are usually directed at individuals who represent a particular group (politicians, police, military personnel, journalists, and so on). Sometimes the intent is to wound, while in other cases the goal is the assassination of the individual or individuals. No one assassination is likely to bring about the changes the terrorists desire, but a campaign of such assassinations generates greater fear. Hostage situations in airline hijackings or the capture of buildings (the takeover of the school in Beslan in Russia by Islamic extremists) demonstrate the vulnerability of society and generate publicity for the terrorist cause. Even when governments refuse to make major concessions, they will often at least publicize a list of demands by the terrorists or publish other kinds of communiqués.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have become a special security concern for governments. There is a great fear that some terrorist groups will use biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological (dirty) weapons to cause more casualties. To some extent, terrorist groups have already gained a psychological edge simply because of the fear of their use. There have been only a few such attacks to date. Aum Shinriyko, the Japanese cult, attempted to use nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system to cause mass casualties but failed. The anthrax attacks in the United States after 9/11 generated great fear, but there were only a few deaths. A single bomb might have killed more people, but the use of anthrax made the attacks more terrifying. Most terrorists, however, still prefer to stick to the tried-and-true techniques, at least until the utility of a new technique, such as car bombs, has been demonstrated.

One deadly technique that has been increasingly used by terrorists is suicide attacks. Such attacks can be

more deadly since casualties will be maximized. Recent attacks have been devastating, as with the airliners on 9/11 and bombers in Israel. Suicide attacks as a technique were first used on a large scale by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. They were responsible for more suicide attacks than all other groups put together between 1980 and 2000 (Radu 2002). Such attacks have increased in various parts of the Middle East, Chechnya, and elsewhere in the twenty-first century. Many of these attacks have inflicted large numbers of casualties, while others have been directed against important political figures. The increased use of suicide attacks by all kinds of terrorist organizations is one indication of how successful such tactics have been in gaining publicity and heightening fear in target audiences. Perhaps the greatest danger in the future is that a suicide attack might be combined with the use of biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. If the persons involved in the use of these weapons are willing to die in the effort, many of the problems involved in using WMD will have been reduced.

Terrorists have great flexibility in choosing their targets. If one target is too carefully protected, they can simply shift to another. Some other individual, building, or large gathering of people will serve to send the message that everyone in the target audience is vulnerable. The ability to find vulnerable targets may be greater in democratic states, since government security is likely to be weaker than in equivalent authoritarian societies. There are limitations on how much a democratic state can monitor its citizens and visitors. Democracies also provide greater publicity for the cause, since the media face few, if any, restraints. Further, even if the terrorists are caught, they will be tried in some type of impartial judicial setting where proof of guilt must be established. Of course, it is not only democratic countries that are vulnerable. Security forces may be weak in a variety of non-democratic political systems providing terrorist groups with opportunities to operate relatively freely.

Prevalence of terrorism

Terrorism has been present in the world for centuries. In recent years, better statistics have been available for such violence. Tables 19.1 and 19.2 provide some extremely useful data on the occurrence of terrorism. The statistics include both domestic and international incidents. The numbers are drawn from a database that is currently maintained at the University of Maryland. This database incorporates material from earlier databases. For the

numbers in the table, only violent actions that sought social, economic, or political objectives, that were also outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, and that had a target audience were included. Using these criteria limited the number of actions that were included in the two tables. A large majority of terrorist actions are domestic, but international incidents are more likely to be reported. Between 1998 and 2004 the number of clear incidents of terrorism with political objectives wavered at a level of about 1,000 per year. In the following six years the total number increased, reaching well over 2,500 in 2007. There are some indications that the number has been declining, but the total for 2010 was still higher than any of the years from 1998 to 2005, suggesting that terrorism remains an important security concern. The number of deaths in attacks has shown less of a pattern. Some earlier years—2001 with the 9/11 attacks and 1998 have much higher death tolls than other years.

There are some noteworthy trends in geographic terms. North America has had relatively few incidents and deaths with the obvious exception of the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism in Latin America has clearly declined. Incidents and deaths in West Europe and the former Soviet Bloc have dropped as well. Asia and the Middle East and North Africa have accounted for the increases in terrorist violence. The conflicts in Sri Lanka (ended for now), Iraq, Afghanistan, problems in India and Pakistan, and the ongoing conflict in Israel/Palestine explain the high levels of activity in the Middle East and Asia. The shifting geographical patterns also suggest that significant outbreaks of terrorism can occur in new areas and that the defeat of terrorism in one country or region will not mean that there will be an overall global decline.

KEY POINTS

- Statistics indicate that terrorism increased significantly after 9/11 and remains at higher levels than in earlier years.
- Domestic terrorism is often not as newsworthy as international actions, but it accounts for a large majority of terrorist attacks.
- Terrorist groups can be very flexible in their choice of targets.
- Terrorist groups often find that democratic states or weaker authoritarian political systems are more inviting targets.
- Some groups may be willing to use weapons of mass destruction, but most terrorist organizations continue to rely on conventional weapons for their attacks.

Table 19.1 Terrorist incidents, by region, 1998–2010

Year	Region							Total
	Africa	Asia ¹	Eastern Europe ²	Latin America	Europe	Middle East	North America ³	
1998	84	177	126	111	134	234	29	892
1999	120	275	132	108	200	251	153	1139
2000	127	471	166	106	173	187	34	1264
2001	107	413	207	131	168	255	40	1321
2002	65	311	91	101	86	257	32	943
2003	50	439	81	106	110	236	30	1052
2004	28	391	47	41	48	401	9	967
2005	55	732	71	50	93	738	17	1756
2006	103	1108	66	53	90	1038	13	2471
2007	249	1108	57	45	64	1195	18	2736
2008	171	959	99	57	100	776	19	2181
2009	147	901	97	18	94	492	4	1750
2010	249	1077	112	52	77	376	8	1877

¹ Includes Australasia and the Pacific islands.

² Former communist countries of Eastern Europe and successor states of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia.

³ United States, Canada, and Mexico.

Source: START (2011)

Types and causes of terrorism

Terrorism has been widespread, and there is no single cause that explains outbreaks of this kind of violence. It is a complex phenomenon with many facets. Linked with the causes of terrorism are the motivations of the various organizations involved in the violence, motivations that provide some clues as to the underlying causes. These motivations can be used to categorize groups in terms of their objectives. The basic types are religious, ethnic or nationalist, and ideological. Additionally, there are groups that are more difficult to place into any particular category given the complexity of their motivations.

Categories

Religious groups obviously come to mind in the twenty-first century, given their prevalence in recent years. Al-Qaeda is the most prominent example since 2000, with the global nature of its attacks, but

it is not the only such group in operation. There are other Islamic groups, some with linkages to al-Qaeda and the broader global jihadist movement, that have been active in Indonesia, India, Egypt, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Russia, Algeria, the Philippines, and other countries. Religious terrorism, however, has not been limited to Islamic organizations; extremists' groups in other religious traditions have also used the technique. The violent anti-abortion activities in the United States are based in Christian viewpoints. Christian beliefs were used to justify ethnic-cleansing activities against Muslims in Bosnia. There was a guerrilla struggle in the Indian Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s that pitted Sikhs against Hindus. The Sikh uprising was in part a reaction to extremist Hindu groups in India that sought to reclaim the subcontinent for their religion and to drive out foreign religions, especially Islam and also Christianity. Jewish extremists, justifying their actions by religious beliefs, have used terrorist tactics against Palestinians, and a Jewish extremist

Table 19.2 Terrorist fatalities, by region, 1998–2010

Year	Region							Total
	Africa	Asia ¹	Eastern Europe ²	Latin America	Europe	Middle East	North America ³	
1998	1526	1336	168	600	48	995	5	4678
1999	784	666	454	235	11	562	5	2717
2000	649	1383	231	209	30	310	0	2812
2001	782	1080	238	243	29	632	3004	6008
2002	90	1153	379	251	9	906	3	2991
2003	320	995	283	183	5	844	2	2632
2004	271	1746	634	120	195	2134	0	5100
2005	368	1393	102	132	58	3447	2	5502
2006	910	2882	50	112	4	4712	8	8678
2007	1196	3378	41	71	78	8754	24	13542
2008	555	2219	66	42	1	2305	15	5203
2009	430	2260	88	8	10	1782	3	4581
2010	378	2004	162	4	5	1257	3	3813

The exact number of fatalities occurring in some attacks is unknown.

¹ Includes Australasia and the Pacific islands.

² Former communist countries of Eastern Europe and successor states of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia.

³ United States, Canada, and Mexico.

Source: Start (2011)

assassinated prime minister Yitzak Rabin for making concessions to the Palestinians. Aum Shinrikyo was willing to attack Japanese society and to cleanse it of the impure. Many religious groups are too weak to impose their views in other fashions, and terrorism then becomes the weapon that they use.

Groups defined by their ethnic or linguistic identifications are another broad category (see Case Study 19.2). The Basque Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA—Basque for Homeland and Freedom) has been seeking independence for the Basque region of Spain since 1959, and began using violence to achieve that goal in 1968. The Tamil Tigers sought independence (or at least autonomy) for those areas of Sri Lanka where Tamils are a majority. Turkey has faced significant terrorist attacks from Kurdish separatist groups. A large number of anti-colonial groups in the past were ethnically based and used terrorism as one tactic in their efforts to gain independence. Algerian nationalists mounted a major

urban terrorism campaign against the French in the late 1950s to supplement guerrilla activities. Greek Cypriots also used urban terrorism and guerrilla attacks against the British in the same period. In Palestine, Jewish settlers (who qualify as nationalist in this context, since most of the settlers were quite secular) relied only on terrorism in their successful efforts to force the British to leave the territory.

Other terrorist groups have drawn their ideas from ideologies. There was a wave of terrorist violence in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s rooted in various leftist and Marxist ideologies. The Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and other groups in Europe were joined by Japanese groups, the Weathermen in the United States, and organizations in Latin America. The leftist wave was on the wane by the last part of the 1980s, when the collapse of communism in East Europe and the Soviet Union weakened the surviving groups even further. Some leftist groups have



CASE STUDY 19.2 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

The struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians is often seen as a religious conflict, but it was for many years primarily a clash of nationalisms. Most of the initial Jewish settlers were largely secular, and the original Palestinian resistance movements were overwhelmingly secular as well. Only in the 1990s did the Palestinian opposition take on overtly religious objectives, such as the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in all of the Occupied Territories and Israel. The **Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)** always focused on Palestinian nationalism and stressed secular themes, so that it could appeal to both Muslim and Christian Palestinians. It was an umbrella organization that included many different Palestinian nationalist groups, but it never included avowedly Islamic groups. **Fatah**, the organization led by Yasser Arafat, was one of the most important organizations, but others like the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)** combined leftist ideology

with Palestinian nationalism. For them the Palestinians were an oppressed Third World people battling against the evils of global capitalism and its Israeli representatives in the Middle East. The PLO initially used guerrilla raids against Israel, but, after the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, it shifted to terrorism as the remaining hope for creating a Palestinian homeland. At various times groups, such as the PFLP and others, left the PLO (temporarily or permanently) because of disputes over the course of action to be followed—for example, when terrorist attacks were limited, when they were discontinued, and when the agreement to create the Palestinian Authority was made in Oslo. Some of these organizations were eventually willing to rejoin the PLO. The PLO and Fatah have been displaced to some extent by **Hamas** and the **Palestinian Islamic Jihad** which have a much more religious orientation that drives their activities.

survived and have continued to be active in Nepal, India, Mexico, and Ecuador. Terrorist groups based in right-wing ideologies have also been present. Such groups were relatively weak in the years after the Second World War, but a great number of them appeared in the 1990s in Western Europe. These groups have often been opposed to foreign influences, a large state, or leftist ideas. They have frequently targeted migrants and foreign workers, especially those from the Middle East, South Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa where cultural, ethnic, and religious differences reinforced each other. Anders Breivik's views that led

him to launch his attack in Norway were drawn from the ideology of these groups. Such groups have their counterparts in the United States with xenophobic and anti-black groups. The **Ku Klux Klan** was once one of the largest of such groups (see Case Study 19.3). It was severely weakened in the 1960s and 1970s, but its place has been taken by a large number of smaller groups espousing some of the same racist and anti-foreign ideas. When groups from the left and right have battled each other, more conservative governments tolerated the violent right-wing groups that targeted members of the left.



CASE STUDY 19.3 The Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

The KKK is a classic American terrorist group that propounded racist and right-wing views in the 1950s and 1960s. It tried to terrorize Black Americans and their white supporters during the civil-rights struggle of those years. Lynchings, murders, and bombs were used in a failed attempt to dissuade people from agitating for equal rights. This period, violent though it was, resulted in hundreds of deaths. The most active period for the KKK was in the 1920s. In this period the KKK combined its racist orientation with opposition to the presence of Catholics, Jews, and Orientals. It was also opposed to the arrival of new immigrants (many of whom were Catholic or Jewish). In these years the KKK had significant strength

outside the Southern states; in fact, Indiana at one time had the largest membership of any state branch. The overall level of violence by racist and anti-foreign groups, including the KKK, was greater in this period with lynchings and murders totalling in the thousands (Hofstadter 1970: 65). Many of the dead were Black Americans, but members of other groups were also victims. Whites were at times the main targets, as they were considered more dangerous by the KKK because they had been contaminated by foreign ideas (Tucker 1991: 5). The KKK eventually declined, partially as a consequence of scandals that involved the leaders, including the leader of the Indiana chapter (Chalmers 1965: 167–70).

Some groups are more difficult to categorize. A number of right-wing groups in the United States incorporate Christianity into their ideologies (sometimes in unusual ways). The Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland has mobilized support on the basis of Irish versus British nationalities, but the role of religion in the struggles in the province cannot be denied. Ideology has also appeared in this struggle since the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) shared the ethnic Irish basis of the IRA but also included a Marxist-Leninist ideological component. In Colombia there were some straightforwardly Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups that operated in the country, but others such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) joined forces with drug cartels. In Peru in the 1980s and 1990s dissident organizations using terror combined leftist ideology with an ethnic appeal to the Indian communities that have been ignored by the Europeanized elite of the country. These Peruvian groups also developed links with the weaker drug cartels in that country. Drug cartels in Mexico have become an increasing threat in that country. Thousands have died. While some of the violence reflects battles among competing criminal groups, in other cases the violence has been intended to intimidate government officials, the police, or general public. These criminal groups could eventually begin to cooperate with anti-government organizations. Drug organizations have cooperated with terrorist groups in many other countries as well, and there are increasing connections between criminal organizations and terrorist groups.

Causes

The causes of terrorism are in many ways similar to the causes of most other forms of political violence (such as riots, rebellions, coups, and civil wars). Individuals in a society become so discontented or frustrated with their inability to bring about what they see as necessary changes since other means of seeking change have failed that they resort to violence. The dissidents have a perception that society and the political system discriminate or are unfair. What is ultimately important are the perceptions of the dissidents, although greater levels of exploitation may drive larger numbers to attempt violent change.

There are some specific factors, however, that can contribute to outbreaks of terrorism. Many regard terrorists as mentally deranged or otherwise suffering

from psychological problems. There is little evidence that such a situation actually exists. From the evidence available, terrorists appear to be no more likely to suffer from psychological disorders than members of the general population. Poverty has been suggested as an underlying cause of terrorism, but analyses have indicated that poverty is not linked to terrorist outbreaks. Terrorism is not prevalent in poorer countries, and terrorists are not more likely to come from the poorer sections of individual societies. While poverty may in fact be a contributing factor in many cases, there is no compelling evidence that terrorism is linked to poverty in any systematic way. The general characteristics of a political system can be a factor. Democracies with their limitations on the security forces provide opportunities for terrorists. Limited political participation and repression by government forces can also breed the necessary popular discontent for violence, but states with strong security forces and firm control of their societies can usually prevent terrorists from operating. Dissidents and potential dissidents can be jailed, suspects can be tortured, families can be held hostage, and convictions can be guaranteed in the courts (if trials occur). When the Soviet Union was a strong centralized system, terrorism was virtually unknown. The successor states are weaker, and some like Russia have faced significant terrorist problems. It is the inability of the government of Colombia to function effectively in many parts of the country that has provided significant opportunities for guerrillas and terrorists, as well as the drug cartels, to survive and prosper. Similarly, the weak state in Yemen has permitted groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula opportunities to operate, while the lack of an effective government in Somalia has also provided opportunities for terrorist groups to operate.

The processes involved with globalization have also contributed to outbreaks of terrorism. With faster communications and transportation, outside forces—usually Western—intrude into local societies. Economies are disrupted, and, even if winners outnumber losers, there are still losers. Further, local cultures, including religious components, are threatened by globalization, especially when it has been accompanied by secularization. Terrorism in many cases can be seen as a reaction to globalization. Leftist groups around the world have opposed the spread of capitalism and all its evils. Secular globalization also leads to religious and ethnic fragmentation (Ramakrishna and Tan 2003: 3–4). Many religious groups

(Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu) are opposed to the secularism that comes with modernity (Pillar 2001: 65). Right-wing, ethnocentric groups have opposed the dilution of their cultures by the outside ideas that accompany migrants, guest workers, and refugees. It is perhaps ironic that Muslims in the Middle East feel threatened by the intrusion of European or Western values at the same time that extremist groups in Europe feel threatened by individuals from Middle Eastern cultures with Islamic ideas. Terrorism rooted in ethnic differences can also reflect the intrusion of outside forces, and groups like the Irish and the Basques fear the submergence of their language and culture into a larger ethnic identity (Dingley and Kirk-Smith 2002).

Ultimately, there are a number of underlying causes that combine in different ways in different circumstances to create the conditions that are conducive to outbreaks of terrorism. For example, globalization can lead to changes in societies that increase poverty and weaken governments. The appearance of new democracies is a consequence of globalization and the spread of new ideas. The presence of democratic systems, however, has only been associated with more terrorism in some circumstances (Lutz and Lutz 2010). Thus, although it is possible that the creation of new democracies may eventually lead to less terrorism some time in the future, in the short term the appearance of new democratic systems may provide additional opportunities for terrorist groups to appear.

KEY POINTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no one cause of terrorism. • Terrorism is a technique that is available to different kinds of groups pursuing different types of objectives. • Terrorism is not unique to Islam or the Middle East. • Globalization and responses to it can be linked to fresh outbreaks of terrorism.

Security measures

Leaders and governments facing terrorist attacks have to defend against these attacks. Since there is no one overwhelming cause or source of terrorism, both because it is a technique that can be used by different groups for different objectives and because different

factors cause terrorism, countermeasures become more difficult. Sederberg's threefold typology is relevant as a point of reference, because some security or counterterrorism measures are more in keeping with viewing terrorism as war, others fit terrorism as crime, and yet others are more relevant for the disease analogy. Counterterrorism measures can also be considered within the scope of prevention, response to attacks, international collaboration, and the effects of security measures on civil liberties.

Prevention

Prevention is normally associated with the concept of terrorism as war or crime. All governments will practice prevention—repression from the terrorist perspective—by seeking to arrest or eliminate those actively involved in the violence. Security forces want to attack the terrorists before they strike (war) or to arrest them after the attack (crime). Clearly, whichever concept of battling terrorism is chosen helps to determine security policies. The war conceptualization, for example, permits a stronger pre-emptive response. In actual fact, however, the military and police functions do not have a precise dividing line. Police forces dealing with dangerous criminals (terrorist or otherwise) may shoot first and ask questions later. In both the warfare and criminal models, there may be a desire to capture terrorists to elicit further intelligence, sometimes by offering shorter sentences to a captured terrorist in exchange for information. Informers inside the terrorist groups can be key assets for the security forces for gathering intelligence. The use of informers is difficult in the case of small groups; they are usually too cohesive for effective infiltration. Larger organizations are easier to penetrate and thus gain information, but it is unlikely that all the operations of larger groups can be stopped by intelligence gathering except with the passage of time. Similarly, loose network groups such as al-Qaeda and right-wing extremist groups in the United States and Europe are difficult to dismantle because of any single intelligence coup, although actions based on successful intelligence gathering can weaken them as was the case with the raid on bin Laden's compound in Pakistan.

Greater physical security measures are another preventive option that has merit, whether one views terrorism as war, crime, or disease. Not every possible target can be protected of course, but key installations, including potential sources of materials

for weapons of mass destruction, however, can be secured. In other cases security can be enhanced for many potential targets, even if all attacks cannot be prevented. Some terrorist activities might be foiled, and in other cases some members of the dissident groups may be captured or killed as a consequence of improved security. These preventative measures will not stop determined terrorists, who will seek other, more vulnerable targets (see Think Point 19.1). Increased security, of course, will mean increased costs, and the money spent on physical security and target hardening is not available elsewhere in the economy, which could result in important lost economic opportunities.

Responses

Responses to terrorist attacks vary, either explicitly or implicitly, if terrorism is seen as warfare, crime, or disease. If the war analogy holds, retaliation and punishment become the norms. Pre-emptive strikes against training facilities or at headquarters, or even the assassinations of key individuals in the terrorist organizations are potential responses. The United States and its allies have attempted to follow this strategy against al-Qaeda, albeit with less than complete success. In their confrontations before the Oslo Accords, Israel and the PLO basically viewed their struggle in terms of covert warfare. Even though Israel considered the PLO and other Palestinian groups to be terrorists and consciously refused to consider Palestinians as soldiers,

the context of the struggle was one of warfare. Israel continued the same approach in dealing with attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Arrest, capture, trial (fair or otherwise), and incarceration reflect the crime perspective. The ultimate goal of police forces is to deter action by demonstrating that criminals will be caught and punished. The same goal is present with terrorists; capture and punishment are inevitable. While the warfare analogy can attempt to deter terrorism by guaranteeing a quick, deadly response, deterrence is more central to a justice system. Pre-emptive strikes and assassinations are not normally part of the arsenal of crime fighting unless a government unleashes death squads as a form of state violence or permits groups allied with the government to attack in this fashion. In such circumstances governments have shifted from the crime perspective to one closer to the warfare analogy. One form of pre-emption available in a normal criminal context is detention of suspects—sometimes for lengthy periods (but not indefinite ones), and perhaps judicial harassment of suspects. Hostage situations are one area where terrorism is frequently treated as crime. Police forces are usually better equipped and trained to deal with these kinds of situations. Even rescue attempts are not foreign to typical police practice although some military units train for rescue operations. The war response might be more difficult for the hostages, since a military response might see them as potential casualties of a conflict with terrorists rather than considering their safety as the prime objective.

! THINK POINT 19.1 Security and the law of unintended consequences

Sometimes improved security can have unintended, and negative, consequences. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States and other countries suffered through a wave of airline hijackings. Individuals from a variety of groups (and loners with no cause but a desire for publicity) skyjacked airliners and issued communiqués justifying their actions. Many of the aircraft were flown to Cuba or Algeria, where the hijackers received asylum in return for releasing the planes and passengers. In response to the hijackings, airport security was improved so that hijackings virtually ceased. Groups could no longer use this tactic to publicize their cause; therefore, some organizations shifted to planting bombs that destroyed airliners to raise public awareness of their objectives. The terrorists even

developed sophisticated bombs that would begin a countdown to detonation only when a certain altitude was reached. Eventually baggage security at airports improved so that only an occasional bomb could be successfully placed on planes, but not before a number of airliners had been destroyed in mid-flight. In some ways the use of airliners on 9/11 was a response to the difficulties of placing bombs on aircraft. It is clear that defensive security precautions can be important, but committed terrorists can find new techniques (Enders and Sandler 2006: 5). These new techniques may be more deadly than the methods that were replaced. Even if new techniques do not appear in some cases, terrorist organizations can find population groups or other targets that are now vulnerable.

If terrorism is viewed as a disease, the range of responses will change. Since diseases have both symptoms and causes, this perspective requires that some of the responses related to the war and crime views be applied. Terrorist violence, as a symptom, will need to be dealt with by arrest or prevention. The disease perspective, moreover, logically leads to efforts to deal with the underlying causes. Reform packages may become part of the government response in an effort to reduce the appeal of the terrorist groups within the population. If ethnic or religious discrimination is present, laws forbidding discrimination may be passed. If poverty is perceived to be fuelling support for the terrorists, then government programmes to reduce poverty in a region or group may be instituted (at least if the funds are available). If the terrorists are operating in a colonial situation, then the ultimate reform is for the colonial power to grant independence. Of course, it has been argued that reforms will simply encourage the terrorist to continue the violence because they are being rewarded. As one leader of a terrorist group argued, more was won by a few months of violence than by years of peaceful politics (Ash 2003: 63). Under these circumstances reforms may become concessions that fuel the violence rather than a mechanism for ending it; yet, there has been no compelling or consistent evidence that concessions encourage terrorists to continue to use violence to gain even more (Crenshaw 1998: 255). Like other counterterrorist approaches, sometimes concessions will work and sometimes they will make the situation worse.

There are other reasons why reforms cannot eliminate the presence of terrorism. Demands by the terrorist dissidents for the establishment of a religious state, a leftist government, the repression of a minority, or removal of all foreigners or foreign elements may not be acceptable to the majority. The leftists in the 1970s and 1980s in Europe wanted to do away with the international capitalist system, yet most Europeans wanted to continue to receive the benefits of capitalism. Most of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico do not want independence, but groups with this objective have used terror attacks against the United States. The spread of globalization or the intrusion of outside values and new cultures cannot be prevented. In other cases, extremist groups in the same country may have mutually incompatible goals. Extreme Jewish settler groups in Israel want complete control of the West Bank and all Palestinians to leave; Hamas wants to create an Islamic state in the whole of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. No Israeli government can meet the demands of both groups. In

Turkey in the 1970s dissident terrorists from the left and the right attacked the Turkish government. There was no programme available that could meet the demands of both sides. In circumstances such as these, even a government or political leaders otherwise amenable to reforms will have to rely on other options.

International measures

International cooperation among countries is another important counterterrorist technique. Intelligence agencies operate best on their own soil or in their own region; national intelligence agencies are not equally effective everywhere. Collaboration among intelligence agencies, as has occurred in the European Union, therefore, will contribute to the prevention of terrorism. International cooperation can also provide the necessary support for reforms that reduce the severity of terrorism. Sanctions against countries aiding terrorists have worked in the past, but in the second decade of the twenty-first century there are few state sponsors that can be targeted. Military action was effective in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ending its support for al-Qaeda, and this military action had widespread international support (unlike the later military action against Iraq). While cooperative international sanctions do not always work, it is important to note that they have not always failed.

A great deal of international diplomacy has involved attempts to define terrorism so that all countries could then take steps to eliminate terrorist groups. These efforts have faltered because countries often support or sympathize with dissidents who use violence against repressive governments. Governments in the developing world have wanted to avoid situations where anti-colonial struggles are labelled as terrorism. Most countries have not favoured too strict a definition, since they want the flexibility to avoid extradition or punishment of some political dissidents. The United States would not have considered anti-Saddam Hussein dissidents as terrorists had they attacked members of his regime. There have been some successes in the international sphere. Certain types of actions, such as air piracy, have been outlawed, and most members of the United Nations have signed these treaties and conventions (Pillar 2001: 77–9). These partial agreements are a positive step in the process of containing terrorism by defining certain actions as crimes. When global agreements are not possible, diplomacy can achieve agreements among smaller groups of countries, providing

for greater cooperation and bilateral arrangements that automatically prohibit asylum for individuals associated with certain organizations. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, eventually signed a bilateral agreement making it easier to extradite suspected IRA members from the United States.

Civil liberties in peril

A final concern that has appeared with counterterrorism efforts in many countries is the potential threat that such measures can have for civil liberties. Democracies cannot routinely use torture, threaten the families of suspects, guarantee convictions, maintain intrusive surveillance of individuals, or kill suspected terrorists, while authoritarian states do not worry about civil liberties. There are also limits on intelligence gathering and pre-emptive actions in democracies. Increased security measures can lead to infringements on the rights of citizens or foreign residents. In the United States, the Patriot Act has permitted lengthy detention of non-citizens on only suspicion of terrorism, more intensive surveillance techniques, limited access to lawyers for nationals, and deportation of non-citizens with little opportunity to defend themselves. In addition, persons captured overseas have been placed in indefinite detention at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba with limited access to legal assistance or any right to challenge their detention. Others captured outside of the United States have been sent to countries where suspects have few or no rights and thus can be subjected to vigorous interrogation. There have also been efforts to establish

special tribunals to try suspected terrorists that would be expected to operate in ways to make conviction of suspects more likely than would be the case in normal courts. In Northern Ireland IRA intimidation of jurors led to the use of courts without juries, and preventative detention for IRA suspects was also introduced. Special terrorism laws passed in the United Kingdom increased the danger of wrongful convictions. Even without special legislation, judges and juries may be quick to assume the guilt of suspected terrorists. Germany, France, and Australia—like the United Kingdom and the United States—passed new legislation after the events of 9/11, giving government security forces greater powers to detain and interrogate those suspected of terrorism (Haubrick 2003). India has infringed on the civil rights of citizens in its struggles with Sikhs in the Punjab, dissidents in Kashmir, and opposition groups elsewhere in the country. While Israel has generally respected the rights of its own citizens, its treatment of Palestinian suspects has been much less concerned with civil rights. While emergency laws and procedures may be necessary in especially serious situations of terrorist challenges, such laws should be temporary and subject to frequent review in democracies (Wilkinson 2006: 62).

In such circumstances there is always the danger of convicting innocent people (see Case Study 19.4). There is also a danger that suspect communities will be created. Individuals may be targeted for investigation (profiled) because of their religion or ethnicity or political beliefs. The general public may also effectively undermine individual rights by their suspicions. Civil liberties are in the least danger if



CASE STUDY 19.4 Miscarriages of justice with Irish defendants

In 1974 IRA attack teams set off bombs in Woolwich in London and Guildford in Surrey that killed off-duty service personnel (and others). A month later two pubs in Birmingham were bombed. These bombings led to the passage of the **Prevention of Terrorism Acts (Temporary Provisions)**—initially renewed and then given permanent status—which provided for longer detention of IRA suspects for questioning and other changes that facilitated intelligence gathering. Four suspects (the Guildford Four) were arrested, convicted, and imprisoned on shaky evidence and coerced confessions. Their arrests also led to the arrest and conviction on weak forensic evidence of seven more suspects (the Maguire Seven). The bombings in Birmingham resulted in the conviction of six individuals (the Birmingham Six)

with weak evidence and coerced confessions. Sixteen of the seventeen individuals were Irish, and the seventeenth was the English girlfriend of one of the suspects. The special interrogation procedures available to the authorities under the terrorism legislation permitted over-zealous police officers to coerce confessions and manipulate evidence to convict the individuals whom the police thought were guilty. Juries were clearly inclined to believe the police and doubtful of the Irish suspects. While there is no evidence that the police, the courts, or the government had a concerted policy to manufacture convictions, the climate of fear and the desire to convict someone for the bombings contributed to these miscarriages of justice (Lutz et al. 2002).

KEY POINTS

- Detection and prevention of terrorist attacks will not always be possible since terrorists have choices among vulnerable targets.
- Dealing with terrorism within the context of warfare is more likely to result in pre-emptive actions.
- Considering terrorism within the disease perspective places greater emphasis on reforms than either the crime or the war perspective.
- International cooperation for dealing with terrorism would appear to have natural limits, and any global agreements on a meaningful definition of terrorism are unlikely.
- The greatest threat to civil liberties in democracies comes in those contexts where the battle against terrorism is seen as being equivalent to war.

terrorism is viewed as a disease where the root causes need to be treated. The crime model provides for some threat to civil liberties, but defenders of civil liberties frequently deal with the police and criminal justice system and politicians aware they are under scrutiny. The greatest danger comes when governments regard the battle against terrorism as warfare because most democratic countries permit greater restrictions on the rights of individuals during wartime. As a consequence, viewing the struggle with terrorism as war tends to bring with it the idea that temporary personal sacrifices of liberties may be necessary in the interest of victory. Ultimately, civil liberties in democratic societies can be in jeopardy. 'Overreaction and general repression . . . could destroy democracy far more rapidly and effectively than any campaign by a terrorist group' (Wilkinson 2006: 61).

Conclusion

It is clear that terrorism will remain a major security threat for years to come. The ethnic, religious, and ideological disputes that have fuelled terrorism in the past have not disappeared. While ideological terrorism has declined with the end of communism, it has not disappeared as right-wing groups and fewer leftist groups continue to operate. Ethnically and religiously inspired terrorism remains very important. Groups that cannot attain their goals through the electoral process or government takeovers will often adopt terrorism as a technique. Globalization will continue to disrupt economic, political, social, religious, and cultural systems. Weak states will be inviting targets for attacks or provide terrorists with convenient bases. Government repression will generate opposition. Connections between terrorists and criminal groups could increase.

Providing security against terrorism will not be easy. There are too many targets. Terrorists have the advantage of being able to choose targets that are not defended. No one countermeasure will defeat terrorism—it has multifaceted causes and is a technique that can be used by many different groups. Success against one group will not guarantee success against another. Groups come from different backgrounds, have different kinds

of support, and seek different objectives. Under these circumstances it would be amazing if there was one countermeasure that always worked. In some cases, normal police methods will be very successful. Treating terrorism as crime, for example, could be quite appropriate when terrorists have links with drug cartels. Considering terrorism as war is relevant in cases where the dissident groups combine terrorism with guerrilla activities, as has been the case with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. In other cases there may be some value in governments considering reforms as one means of weakening support for the dissidents or as a compromise to end violence. Looking at terrorism from the perspective of war, crime, or disease is useful for analysis and for pinpointing problems that can occur when one or the other of these particular approaches is taken, but many terrorist groups and situations do not fit neatly into any one situation. The necessary response will often be a mixture of elements involving all three, and determining the appropriate mix of security programmes and responses to terrorism will never be easy. Security measures for dealing with terrorist threats are likely to require flexibility, and government security forces will have to change techniques in different circumstances.



QUESTIONS

1. Is terrorism likely to become more prevalent or less prevalent around the world?
2. Which areas of the world are most vulnerable to terrorism and why?
3. What other categories of terrorism might be added to the religious, ideological, and ethnic varieties?
4. What role do the media play in international terrorism and domestic terrorism?
5. What techniques might be most effective in dealing with different kinds of terrorism? Why?
6. Does the appearance of leaderless resistance styles of terrorism or network systems create special problems for countermeasures?
7. Is terrorism best dealt with as war, crime, or disease in your country?
8. What counterterrorism measures would be most effective in dealing with terrorism in your country?
9. What changes (if any) will occur in the next decade in how terrorist groups operate? How will ways of providing security against terrorism change?
10. Are efforts to defeat or contain terrorism a great threat to civil liberties?



FURTHER READING

- Bjorgo, Tore (2005) (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward*, London: Routledge. This volume provides a comprehensive survey of the types of terrorism (ethnic, religious, ideological, criminal) and techniques with reference to recent events.
- Enders, Walter and Sandler, Todd (2006), *The Political Economy of Terrorism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This book is a compilation of the authors' earlier work. It involves some empirical assessment of terrorism, but it also contains excellent overviews on key topics as well.
- Hoffman, Bruce (2006), *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded edn, New York: Columbia University Press. The new edition of this book, like its predecessor, is one of the best introductions to the topic of terrorist groups and terrorism.
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr. (2003), (ed.) *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. This collection of short articles is still one of the best compilations of works in the field; it covers virtually all the basic issues from a variety of perspectives.
- Laqueur, Walter (2001), *A History of Terrorism*, Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. This book is in part an update of Laqueur's many earlier works. It contains a broad overview of terrorism through time and details the difficulties of viewing terrorism from one or a limited number of perspectives.
- Lutz, James and Lutz, Brenda (2008), *Global Terrorism*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge. This textbook uses case studies to provide historical and geographical depth to the discussion of terrorism. While terrorism in the Middle East and by extremist Islamic groups is covered, the book clearly avoids concentrating on these topics to the exclusion of others.
- Tan, Andrew H. T. (2006), *The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey*, London: Routledge. This volume is an excellent source of information. It contains chapters by individual authors on the various types of terrorism or techniques that are used as well as a very useful compilation of the types of groups that have been operating on some of the key terrorist incidents.
- Tucker, Jonathan B. (ed.) (2000), *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. This volume documents various attempts to use chemical and biological weapons by terrorist groups. Most ended in failures, although the attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan have been an obvious exception. The conclusions drawn from the book about the relative danger of such attacks remain valid today.
- Wilkinson, Paul (2006), *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge. Wilkinson provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist groups and then discusses the effects that terrorism has had on Western democracies.



IMPORTANT WEBSITES

- <http://www.comw.org/rma> Project on Defense Alternatives, Revolution on Military Affairs (RMA)—maintained by the Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA. This website provides access to papers and other works dealing with terrorism, including some papers (from conferences or as working papers) that are not readily available elsewhere.
- <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd> National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database. This database contains information on incidents and casualties by country, region, type of attack, and group from the 1970s forward. This database is a continuation of materials that were first collected at St Andrews and then incorporated into the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. It is the best source for such information.
- <http://www.nctc.gov/> This is the website of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). This centre took over incident reports from the State Department. It has a tracking system for incidents by country (Worldwide Incidents Tracking System) that is directly accessible from this site. The NCTC also published Reports on Incidents of Terrorism for more recent years. The volumes for individual years are more readily accessed with a search engine with the search term 'Reports on Incidents of Terrorism'.



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