

This is a scholarly and sombre account which unpacks the shifting, paradoxical relationship between state and clerical power and ethnic affiliation.

5. Thorat and Umakant, eds. *Caste, Race and Discrimination: Discourses in International Context* (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2004).

Published in association with the Indian Institute of Dalit Studies in New Delhi, this is an even-handed collection that includes key texts from both sides of the debate, including a number arguing against treating casteism as racism. It also provides an excellent overview of Dalit activist perspectives and the attempts to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.

Angana P. Chatterji et al., eds. *Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism is Changing India* (London: Hurst, 2019).

A wide-ranging collection that addresses the economic, ethnic, political, and international dimensions of contemporary Hindu nationalism in India. There are a number of books that seek to dissect this phenomenon, but the fast-paced nature of events means it is useful to read one of the more recent ones.

Enze Han, 'Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 4, 2 (2010), 244–56.

Enze Han provides an ethnographically detailed portrait of tensions between Han settlers and Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. Written before the recent wave of interments, Han's paper shows how ethnic tensions in the province are negotiated in everyday life.

Dru Gladney, *Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects* (London: Hurst, 2004).

Muslims in China are diverse and ethnicized in diverse ways. Gladney's book is an important corrective against stereotypes of Chinese Islamophobia and a major study of how ethnic identities are constructed and reconstructed by the state and its subjects.

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Political Sites of Racist Modernity: Communism, Capitalism, and Nationalism

This chapter explores the relationship between racism and communism, capitalism, and nationalism. The non-Western stories of these 'isms' cannot be accurately narrated as a set of derivative discourses.¹ I begin with communist modernity and racism in the USSR and then turn to capitalist modernity and racism in Indonesia. Both of these large, diverse, and complex societies provide many histories of racism and anti-racism. I argue that racism in the USSR took the form of ethnopolitics, in which suspicion of threats to the state merged the political with the ethnic. In Indonesia I consider the connections between capitalism and racism both for capitalism's winners and for its losers, focusing first on hostility to Chinese Indonesians, widely stereotyped as wealthy, then on the exploitation of the people and land of West Papua, the western half of the island of New Guinea, which has been part of Indonesia since 1963.

The contemporary world is defined and divided by politics and nations. In the late twentieth century, some eager scholars announced the demise of both: a supposedly 'post-political' age was imagined that was also an era in which nations and nationalism were to be superseded by transnationalism and globalization.² Tracing modern racism shows that not only are nations and nationalism far from over, but the most virulently exclusionary, supremacist, and ethnically essentialized forms of nationalism – what may be called racist nationalism – are an active part of twenty-first-century politics. Politics, racism, and nationalism are rarely separable, but notions of the nation as having an ancient and blood-based lineage have a particular importance in the debate on racism in East Asia. To

examine racist nationalism more closely, I turn to the construction of an ethno-racial national identity in South Korea. Racism, capitalism, socialism, and nationalism are separate words but not separate practices. In the final part of this chapter I use the example of apartheid South Africa to show how they can co-exist.

Communist Modernity and Racism in the USSR³

Regimes pursuing idealist fantasies, such as the Communist vision of a classless society or 'new man' or ambitious transformational schemes like crash industrial or agricultural modernization, have often resorted to concomitant racist or violent methods even on a mass scale, up to or including genocide. This is true of the two giant Communist regimes, Stalin's USSR and Mao's China. (Ben Kiernan)⁴

The scale and range of the ethnic purges and mass deportations of 'nationalities' undertaken in the USSR is without parallel. From the 1930s to 1953, what Weitz calls 'the stigma of collective guilt that the Soviets assigned to suspect populations and a fateful move on the way to the "racialization" of enemies' augured numerous mass ethnic deportations.⁵ The first such mass deportation was of ethnic Koreans, suspected of being potential Japanese allies. Weitz tells us that the regime 'sought out nearly every single Korean for removal', a thoroughness that would come to be applied to many other ethnic and national communities.⁶ In all some fifty-eight such communities were subject to mass deportation. Over recent decades the resultant deaths have been acknowledged in a series of official statements. For example, the deportation of Chechens and Ingush was acknowledged by the European Parliament as an act of genocide in 2004, and the deportation of Crimean Tatars has been recognized as genocide by a number of national parliaments.⁷ Figuring out the number of deaths amongst nationalities caused by forced exile has been complicated by the fact that other forms of violence, such as starvation and famine, were also used against them.⁸ The term 'genocide' has been applied by some historians to the famines that occurred during the Soviet era, most famously the 1932–33 'Holodomor' (Ukrainian for 'to kill by starvation'), which took the lives of many millions of Ukrainians. An ideology of ethnopolitical purity grew up alongside these practices. Groups and individuals 'perceived to be hostile', notes Weiner, were

'referred to in biological or hygienic terms – for example, vermin, pollution, or filth – and were subjected to ongoing "purification".'⁹ 'Racial politics were an integral part of Stalin's policy', insists Bukh, 'and a racialized understanding of nationality often resulted in deprivations or purges of whole populations.'¹⁰

The relationship between Soviet socialism and the racialization and ethnicization of modernity has broader political implications. For this aspect of twentieth-century history raises concerns that go to the heart of how we understand the socioeconomic contexts that enable and sustain racism. More specifically, consideration of this aspect of the 'Soviet experiment' is a challenge to communism's claim to anti-racism and, more widely, the idea that the politicization of identity is inimical to its naturalization. The idea of 'the West' was employed in Soviet discourse (especially from the late 1920s onwards) as a repository of social ills. In particular, by claiming that racial and ethnic discrimination were ailments of the Western capitalist world, Soviet leaders let it be known that to identify such problems within the USSR was not just misguided but counter-revolutionary. Moreover, the idea that racial and ethnic discrimination had been overcome in the USSR was once widely accepted outside the 'Soviet bloc'. Indeed, it was seen as one of the key Soviet advantages in the Cold War struggle over Asia and Africa.¹¹ This stereotype persists and helps explain the neglect of the topic in most global overviews of racism and the tendency to either ignore 'Soviet colonialism' or portray it as a continuation of Tsarist imperialism and, hence, as a throwback and an anachronism.¹² The Soviet Union was a modern, colonial state, but of a new type.¹³ The ideologies that animated the USSR's development reflected and legitimized Eurocentric and Russocentric domination. The rejection of the West and the associated rise of Russian nationalism from the late 1920s onwards have tended to overshadow the intensity and complexity of the westernizing spirit of earlier Bolsheviks. For Lenin and Trotsky, Russia was ripe for westernization; it was something that needed to happen not merely for the revolution to succeed, but for it to be thinkable. Lenin decreed in 1918 that 'it is our task ... not to spare dictatorial methods in order to hasten the copying of Westernism by barbarous Russia even more than did Peter, not shrinking from barbarous methods of struggle against barbarism'.¹⁴ Drawing out the implications of this pronouncement, Stalin, the Commissioner for Nationalities, explained in *Pravda* in 1918 that the revolution 'built a bridge

between the socialist West and the enslaved East ... against world imperialism'.¹⁵ The close association of barbarism and slavery with Asia was, in part, a reflection of the Bolsheviks' reading of Marx.¹⁶ Mixing images of political reaction with those of decay and infestation, Trotsky looked forward to the development of a clean new Western civilization. 'The revolution', he wrote in 1923, 'means the final break of the people with Asianism, with the 17th century, with holy Russia, with ikons and cockroaches.'¹⁷

However, far from being mere echoes of a normative Western colonial paradigm, Soviet ideologies provided a fundamental challenge to them. Western colonialists and neo-colonialists may have been mistaken in fearing that the Soviet Union was, indeed, the beacon of equality that its leaders proclaimed it to be. But their instinct that the USSR was different, that it offered a distinct way of understanding 'progress' and 'civilization', was correct. Indeed, their mistake in not seeing the 'racism' within the USSR was less a failure to see the country's similarities with the West than an inability to appreciate just how unlike the West Soviet society really was. For, whereas modernity in the 'capitalist West' tended to be simultaneously depoliticizing and racializing (typically, if not exclusively, around the idea that European-heritage people were the natural bearers of modernity), in the USSR it was simultaneously politicizing and ethnicizing. Rather than imagining Europeans or Russians as a superior human type, what emerged instead was an ethnopolitical marking of 'communists', 'proletarians', and 'revolutionaries', of whatever ethnic or national group, as inherently more advanced, and more capable of assimilating a Euro-Russian culture of progressive change, than 'backward' elements. In this way communism became not just an ethnopolitical but also a racist project of modernization. The missionary zeal this fusion of beliefs excited is captured by Diuk and Karatnycky in their description of the way that, following the incorporation of imperial Russia's Asian colonial territories into the Soviet Union after the Civil War, young Bolsheviks

went into Soviet Central Asia to promote the Bolshevik creed on a mission to spread enlightenment and dispel years of illiteracy and backwardness. Official records of the era abound in pictures of Kazakh herdsmen marveling at the phenomenon of an electric light bulb, and of Uzbek women seeing the light of day for the first time after emerging from behind the Muslim veil.¹⁸

Communist modernity was presented and offered as a political and politicizing process of social evolution. The civilizing function of European socialist culture was unquestioned. However, the status of nationalism and national identities was actively debated. The Leninist orthodoxy that emerged on this topic turned on the political function of non-Russian nationalism in the USSR in the context of the class struggle. Unlike Siberia and 'Russian East Asia', which were considered to be assimilated parts of Russia, Soviet Central Asia was deemed to need to be propelled along a track of state-sponsored evolution. Its destination was a de-ethnicized, denationalized, 'internationalist' communist identity. However, in order to get this far and to keep its 'backward' populations engaged, it was considered a strategic necessity to have a period of ethno-national identification, a moment for 'them' to collect themselves together and to articulate their oppression as recognizable ethnic entities (as opposed to the unclassifiable and disparate 'tribesmen' encountered by Soviet administrators). These new 'national' units were considered a necessary stage of political development, a stepping stone towards a modern political consciousness.

A critical memo, written in the early 1920s, to the Central Executive Committee on the creation of Soviet republics in Soviet Central Asia called this process the 'Europeanization of the east', describing it as 'an adoption of a nineteenth-century West European tradition, alien to the region'.¹⁹ This summary is certainly apt, but it misses the novel political function of the Soviet 'nation-making' project. It was not intended that entities such as the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as other more ancient countries granted republic status (for example, Armenia and Georgia), were going to be sustained by the Soviet leadership, in the long term, as ethnically distinct nations. Their function was to contain and, finally, to help neutralize and eradicate any form of consciousness that differed from the dominant ethnopolitical categories of communist rule. 'The essence of the national question', explained Stalin in 1921, 'is to liquidate the economic, political and cultural backwardness of the nationalities ... We do this in order to give the backward peoples the opportunity to catch up with central Russia.'²⁰

Soviet attempts during the 1920s to establish, recognize, and incorporate non-Russian nationalities were far-reaching. Positive

discrimination in favour of non-Russian languages, cultures, and economies, on top of the efforts made to indigenize the heavily Russian regional party structures, provided one of the world's first government-sponsored assertions of federal ethnic pluralism. Moreover, the USSR was the leading force in global anti-colonial politics throughout much of the twentieth century. Yet across their vast 'internal' empire, the Bolsheviks sustained an unmistakably colonial regime. For Slezkine, 'by equating ethnicity with development', the Soviet state ensured that the politics of modernity was also an ethnicization of the political.²¹ Any form of suspected, actual or potential resistance to assimilation into an atheist, 'scientific', and Eurocentric Soviet state was perceived as anti-progressive, a symptom of 'backwardness' that needed to be expunged. It was in this way that Soviet communism facilitated the representation of whole communities as unwanted and reactionary.

The violence of this process eventually led towards what Law calls a 'destructionist logic', which 'characterised communist racialisation' both in the USSR and the wider Soviet bloc: '[a]n anti-minority, anti-ethnic, anti-cultural, anti-linguistic ethos driven by the Soviet state permeated these regions'.²² Weitz links 'a specifically Soviet modernity' with the 'vast utopian ambitions' of the USSR, including its ambition to perfect humanity. Thus the project to 'reshape the behaviour, the thought patterns, and the very composition of the population was an intrinsic aspect of Soviet socialist modernity' and designed to establish 'a "quintessential enlightenment utopia" that would result in a "conflict-free, harmonious body"'.²³ A central paradox of this project was that it asserted ethnic and national malleability but fixed and essentialized ethnic, class, and national identities, demarcating trusted and untrustworthy peoples. This paradox blurs many lines, not just between ideology, race, and culture but also between racialized and political conceptions of identity.

In order to further understand how Soviet rule fused politics and ethnicity, it is useful to look in more detail at the most privileged category of identity within Bolshevik communism: the proletariat. Despite the considerable amount of lip service paid to the importance of the peasantry as a potentially revolutionary force, the normative role model of what a real revolutionary looked like wielded the hammer rather than the sickle. For Lenin, cited with approval by Stalin in 1927, 'the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry [exists] in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and

state power'.²⁴ Since urban industrial workers were largely confined to areas of west Russia and European territories, with most of the nations of the Union having predominantly rural populations, the proletariat's supposed dictatorship was heavily ethnically marked. This process was cemented by the enforcement of what Slezkine calls a vision of an 'urban Utopia' as the destiny for all of the Union's nationalities and the stereotyping of peasants and proletarians as two types of humanity with fixed political attributes and trajectories.²⁵ Indeed, when considered alongside his many declarations on peasant and Asian 'backwardness', Trotsky's declaration that '[t]he proletariat in power will stand before the peasants as the class which has emancipated it' starts to resemble Western discourses that claimed colonial rule as a form of native liberation.²⁶ The open scorn for 'the exceedingly low cultural level in the countryside' and the 'unstable' and 'treacherous' sensibilities of the peasantry was rooted in a mutually reinforcing mixture of Eurocentrism, communism, and colonialism.²⁷ The peasant famines of the early 1930s, which had a proportionately greater impact on non-Russian Soviet territories, were one distillation of this noxious brew. Under Stalin, Soviet ethnopolitics became increasingly characterized by nationalism and Russocentrism. This was apparent on many levels, both cultural and economic. As regards the former, it is indicative that, from the early 1930s onwards, Russian history, culture, language, and Cyrillic script as well as Russian national heroes began to be accorded pan-Soviet status. The Russians became the Union's 'elder brothers'; in *Pravda's* words, 'the first among equals'; in Stalin's, 'the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union ... the leading force of the Soviet Union' (from a speech delivered in 1945).²⁸

Economically and environmentally, Russia's borderlands were given over to monoculture (a striking example being the way huge swathes of Uzbekistan were planted with cotton) or other activities considered unsuitable for 'European Russia'. The process of ethnopoliticization legitimized such exploitation. Yet it also made it possible for non-Russians who aligned themselves sufficiently with the communist project to be fully assimilated and find positions of considerable power, especially within the regional bureaucracies of the autonomous regions. The constant emphasis on the communist credentials and consciousness of both individuals as well as communities and nations was not merely a smoke screen for Russian or

Bolshevik dominance: to be a communist was to enter the space of Russian/Soviet modernity, an arena in which the only reference point that was both constant and explicit was loyalty to communism, as defined by the party leadership.

Under the 'neo-Stalinist compromise', through which successive leaders maintained the Union's economic structure while pushing through reformist or counter-reformist political measures (it is conventional to place Khrushchev in the former category and Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in the latter), ethnopolitical and imperial communism was maintained until the last few years of the USSR. However, in the later half of the twentieth century Soviet communism lost its association with economic development and progressive change and became a by-word for inefficiency and inertia. During and after the so-called 'years of stagnation' associated with Brezhnev, modernity began to take on other – distinctly non-communist – connotations. Indeed, it increasingly came to mean copying or assimilating Western (i.e. capitalist and democratic) techniques, even to the point of introducing market-led solutions. By the time Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, faith in the Soviet version of modernity had become largely a matter of rhetorical gesture. The solutions to economic problems were located in the West.

Intellectuals in the West, as elsewhere, once poured considerable energy into dissecting the Bolshevik revolution. Within Bolshevik circles, Lenin's and Trotsky's status as anti-Stalinists was used as sufficient proof of their authentically revolutionary credentials. By contrast, among conservative, liberal, and socialist critics, they tended to be construed as participants in the creation of a tyrannous state. Today, as the USSR has receded from view, this debate has become moribund. Increasingly, the revolution is a topic of indifference. Alexander Zinoviev's comment on the Stalinist epoch now applies to all Soviet history: '[it] has receded into the past, already judged, ridiculed, despised, caricatured, but not yet understood'.²⁹ As the passions that the USSR once animated dissipate, its memory is reduced to a banal 'warning from history' about giving power to bad men like Stalin. Yet the acts of mass violence, including mass ethnic violence, that characterized the history of the Soviet multicultural empire are hard to read through contemporary clichés. Communism in the USSR was and remains a profoundly new and challenging type of modernity not because it was simply 'egalitarian'

or 'authoritarian', but because it was a mixture of the two and because it was based on a novel relationship between the ethnic and the political.

The patterns of ethnopolitical racism that can be found in the history of the USSR cannot simply be translated across to other communist states. The Soviet Union was unique in its size, influence, diversity, and imperial pre-history. Across the many countries where revolutionary socialists took power in the twentieth century, we find some, such as Mozambique and Chile, where ethnopolitics, although present, did not readily translate into patterns of discrimination and hierarchy. We find others where racism and nationalism are even more to the fore. The racial and political purification campaigns waged by the Khmer Rouge are one example and so too, according to Myer's *The Cleanest Race*, is the socialism of contemporary North Korea.³⁰ 'Communist modernity' has many pathways and many histories. However, once we appreciate its specificity, an account of 'red racism' in the USSR can be helpful in opening up the fact that the politicization of identity can go hand in hand with reaction, violence, and hierarchy.

Capitalist Modernity and Racism in Indonesia

Indonesia's official national motto is 'Bhinneka Tunggal Ika', which means 'Unity in Diversity'. It is a suitably ambitious slogan: Indonesia has a population of over 270 million, about 700 languages, and hundreds of ethnic groups.³¹ After independence from the Netherlands was declared in 1945, the country experienced a long era of authoritarian rule under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto. This period came to a close in 1998, with the ousting of Suharto, and a more democratic era began. However, Indonesian politics remains characterized by a militant anti-communism. About half a million communists were killed by the army and local militias in 1965–66 and, to this day, communism remains an outlawed and widely vilified ideology. It may be tempting, therefore, to make a simple contrast between communist USSR and anti-communist/capitalist Indonesia. It does appear that, whereas racism in the USSR tended to exclude and essentialize ethnic communities by casting them as *politically* suspect, in Indonesia, ethnic exclusion and essentialization has proceeded through practices of *economic* concentration and

exploitation. However, in practice, drawing a distinction between 'communist racism' and 'capitalist racism' is not straightforward, for both are managed and overseen by the state. Although capitalism is often defined as an ideology of private capital, it has long been apparent that, in Indonesia as elsewhere, the state is central to its existence.³² In a number of East and South East Asian countries – including the new superpower of China – a governing communist party oversees an expanding capitalist economy, creating a hybrid 'capitalist-communist modernity' that unsettles attempts to neatly demarcate capitalism and communism. In Indonesia, it is not the communist party (which is illegal) but 'crony capitalism' – that is, a nexus of business and state interests – that appears to 'run things'. Many of the critics of 'crony capitalism' in Indonesia allow suspicion of the country's Chinese minority to shape their criticism and argue that the corporate sector is dominated by 'the Chinese' (and by the state in some way in hock to 'Chinese money'). This provides my first example of racism under capitalism and shows how wealth can be ethnically marked and become a site of racist stereotype and exclusion. My second example from Indonesia is very different, for it concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of a marginalized, impoverished, and racialized 'other'. There are many examples of this in Indonesia but my illustration turns to the best known, the colonization of West Papua. Thus whilst my first example shows how those who are caricatured as 'winners' in capitalism can be subject to racism, the second shows how the baton of European racial colonialism has been taken up and carried forward, creating what has been described as a 'slow motion genocide'.³³ Taken together, both cases throw light on what might be called 'clientelist' capitalist racism, in which patronage, prejudice, and contested claims to indigeneity are woven through processes of capital acquisition and expropriation.

Anti-Chinese racism and stereotypes of Chinese wealth

Across South East Asia 'the Chinese' have become associated with wealth. Amy Chua writes that 'Chinese market dominance and intense resentment among the indigenous majority is characteristic of virtually every country in Southeast Asia'.³⁴ In terms of their proportion of the national population, the largest Chinese heritage minority in the region are the 'Chinese' in Malaysia, who comprise about 23 per cent of the population and whose supposed control over

the economy prompted, following 'race riots' in 1969, one of the world's most wide-ranging affirmative action programmes, aimed at enhancing the status of the 'indigenous' Malay population. Chinese Indonesians make up only about 2 per cent of the population but their association with business and money-making has also made them a target of legislation and popular protest.

Most 'Chinese' minorities have been settled in South East Asia for many generations (hence my use of inverted commas around 'Chinese'). In both Malaysia and Indonesia the 'indigenous' status of the majority population – the so-called 'bumiputra' ('sons of the soil') in Malaysia and 'pribumi' ('first from the soil') in Indonesia – whilst widely accepted, is often wielded to justify the denial of rights and identity to the 'non-indigenous'. Despite its small size, the 'Chinese' minority has long been important in provoking consciousness of who is and who is not 'really Indonesian'. Bertrand suggests that it was the presence of the 'Chinese', rather than European colonists, that triggered organized nationalism in the country, noting that the 'first major Indonesian nationalist organization, Serikat Islam (1912), was initially a response from "Native" merchants to Chinese competition'.³⁵ The 'Chinese' found themselves in the double bind of being the victims of Dutch racism but stereotyped as servants of the Dutch by *pribumi* activists, which helps explain why the long struggle for independence, especially during the 'Independence Revolution' (1945–49), was punctuated by anti-Chinese riots.³⁶

The association of the Chinese with business helps explain the envious and derogatory label, 'the Jews of Asia'. 'The term came partly because of the discrimination against us and partly because of our success in business', says Chinese-Filipino Teresita Ang See.³⁷ Bertrand refers to a 'widespread public perception' that 'the Chinese' dominate 70 per cent of Indonesia's economy.³⁸ In recent interviews with high-ranking professionals in Indonesia, Herlianto repeatedly encountered this myth as well as the idea that 'the ethnic Chinese have perhaps learned from the Jews', who, according to one retired general, paraphrased by Herlianto, 'dominate the world economy. Similar to the Jews, the Chinese have spread to every part of the world to do exactly the same thing'.³⁹ Anti-Semitism has, it seems, also acted as a 'master narrative' in the framing of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. Hillel Kieval notes that the 'Javanese' 'learned from European colonial administrators and scholars to assign the specific moral evaluations of anti-Semitism to

the local ethnic context'.⁴⁰ However, Cribb and Coppel warn that this 'master narrative' provides a distorting mirror, encouraging not only an inflation of 'Chinese' influence but also a misapprehension of the nature of the racism they experience. Thus, for example, they show that a myth has been generated that ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have been the victims of a Holocaust-like genocide, a myth that misreads the mass killing of communists in 1965–66 as a mass killing of Chinese. In fact, Cribb and Coppel tell us, 'Chinese Indonesians experienced serious harassment but relatively few were killed.' The persistence of this myth is attributed to a trope dating back to the seventeenth century which equates the social position of Chinese in Indonesia with that of Jews in Europe and which thus predicts periodic pogroms and attempts at genocide.⁴¹ Although the ethnic Chinese did suffer disproportionately in the anti-communist crackdown, particularly through forced displacements,⁴² the 'myth' identified by Cribb and Coppel is a powerful example of the way European models can provide frameworks in which 'other racisms' are understood and, even, misremembered.

Anti-Chinese racism in Indonesia has not been genocidal but remains common and often violent. The 'Chinese' are blamed for numerous ills, including the corruption associated with previous regimes. The riots that accompanied the fall of Suharto in 1998 were, in large measure, 'anti-Chinese' riots, in which hundreds were killed. They targeted ethnic Chinese business owners, both small and large, who were thought to have benefited from Suharto's 'crony capitalism'. Eugene Tan explains that 'ethnic Chinese bore the brunt of grievances and were conveniently scapegoated for various societal ills and habitually accused of disloyalty and exploitation'.⁴³ A subsequent report found that the riots were provoked by the armed forces.⁴⁴ Anti-Chinese racism in Indonesia, although it targets Chinese business and deploys stereotypes of 'Chinese wealth', is not, in any clear way, anti-capitalist. Its politics are ethno-nationalist, an assertion of *pribumi* popular power; an assertion that is fanned and framed by religious hostility to non-Muslims.

The post-1998 reform period has seen the lifting of a variety of anti-Chinese measures, such as the ban on the Chinese-language press and the requirement that, unlike any other citizen, Chinese-Indonesians have identity papers that prove their nationality. Nevertheless, suspicion of the 'Chinese' as exploiters remains widespread. Indeed, drawing on recent attitudinal survey data, Setiadi tells us that an

'increase in anti-Chinese rhetoric' is connected to 'the re-emergence of the term *pribumi* (indigenous) in political and public discourse'.⁴⁵ Moreover, spatial segregation of 'Chinese' from *pribumis* may be worsening, with the two groups increasingly living, working, and going to school apart.⁴⁶ The close business relations the administration of President Joko Widodo has built with China also appear to be kindling resentment. In Herlianto's interviews, the traditional refrain that the Chinese control the country is repeatedly linked to China's new economic power: Chinese-Indonesians are cast, to quote one of Herlianto's interviewees, as 'part of China's strategy to control the Indonesian economy'.⁴⁷ Thus resentment against neoliberalism, foreign capital, and more specifically the influence of China is being channelled by existing stereotypes and exclusions. In 2019 this brew of myths and resentments was poisoned further by anger at the treatment of Muslims in China and, in 2020, by the racialization of Covid-19 as a 'Chinese disease'. A report in *The ASEAN Post* from July 2020 explains the connections between these themes:

many Indonesians on social media have taken to using the term 'Chinese virus' to refer to the COVID-19 coronavirus. Some religious conservatives have been calling for a farwa, or religious decree, to bar Chinese-Indonesians and Chinese nationals from entering Indonesia ... The anti-Chinese sentiment is also indirectly associated with the discrimination of the Uyghurs. The government's unclear stance on the Xinjiang issue has led to many in the country believing that this is because of President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's alleged close relationship with China and the local ethnic-Chinese community ... this belief snowballed into the creation of a popular conspiracy theory among Indonesians that Jokowi was secretly a puppet of the Chinese and that he was selling out Indonesia for his 'master's' economic gains.⁴⁸

Despite the democratization of Indonesia, Chinese-Indonesians continue to be blamed for multiple ills. The racialization of crony capitalism is being enacted in an era of changing power relations and a range of crises that are making and remaking elites but also creating ongoing experiences of vulnerability and marginalization.

West Papua: Extractive capitalism in a neo-colonial settler state

In 1950 Indonesia's President Sukarno declared that 'the Irian [West Papua] question is a question of colonialism or non-colonialism, a

question of colonialism or independence. Part of our country is still colonized by the Dutch.⁵⁴⁹ Yet, with the departure of the Dutch in 1963, colonialism in West Papua was not ended but transferred.⁵⁰ There was minimal consultation with the West Papuan people, who have since been witness to the transformation of their land into a site of intense resource extraction and mass Indonesian settlement. Although verified numbers are not available, hundreds of thousands of West Papuan deaths have been directly attributed to the Indonesian occupation.⁵¹

For nearly sixty years the story of West Papua has been one of racism and natural resource extraction, a combination in which the central state has suppressed and disregarded an indigenous population in the name of the 'development' of a resource-rich periphery.⁵² In 1983 Budiardjo and Liong described the 'official Indonesian view of West Papuans as primitive, barbaric and unproductive', a view hinted at by Foreign Minister Kusumatmaja's explanation that 'What we are doing in Irian Jaya is to introduce the Iranian, which are admittedly of a different cultural level, into the mainstream of Indonesian life.'⁵³ Although, with the advent of reforms in Indonesia, recent years have seen a move towards a more consultative relationship with West Papua, the fundamental dynamic of colonization and exploitation remains unchanged.

West Papua exemplifies why Indonesian capitalism, sometimes cast as an example of 'crony capitalism', can also be described as 'extractive capitalism', a term that refers to the non-renewable and corporate digging up and cutting down of the natural environment. Extractive capitalism has been enabled and intensified by the racial disregard accorded to the West Papuans and other Melanesians. The racial label 'Melanesian' ('melan' referring to 'black' and 'nesia' meaning 'islands') is applied to dark-skinned peoples in New Guinea and a number of islands in the western Pacific. It is derived from European racial anthropology but, since the 1970s, has been 'reclaimed', says Blades, 'as an anticolonial and panethnic identity'.⁵⁴ Thus, for example, after gaining independence in 1980, Vanuatu's first prime minister, Walter Lini, referring to West Papua, declared that 'Vanuatu will not be fully free until all Melanesians are free.'⁵⁵ However, this alliance has been stryimed by the enormous power and influence of Indonesia across the region. Today criticism of the Indonesian government's actions in West Papua is largely limited to a few regional NGOs.

Over the decades West Papua has seen regular conflicts and many deaths. In 2019 fifty-nine were killed in the wake of what Radio New Zealand reported as 'widespread anti-racism protests' that erupted following 'racist harassment of Papuan students in Java', including mobs shouting the word 'monkey' at student housing occupied by Papuans.⁵⁶ Many of the clashes between West Papuans and the military or Indonesian settlers (who, following mass settlement, today constitute more than half of the population) are sparked by mining, logging, and other extractive operations. One notorious example is the protest in the late 1970s against Grasberg mine, West Papua's largest. In 1977 these protests provoked a military operation, codenamed 'Operasi Tumpas' (Operation Annihilation), which is described by Tracey Banivanua-Mar as follows:

Strafing raids against numerous villages, such as the bombing of the village of Iraga and the region of Akimunga with 'Daisy Cluster' bombs dropped from OV-10 Broncos, followed by slash-and-burn raids on the gardens of surviving villagers, were openly aimed at clearing the mountains of resistant habitation ... soldiers burned the houses and churches and shot the livestock in all villages they passed, as well as frequently shooting men, women and children. At a later human rights tribunal hearing, Eliezer Bonay, a former governor of West Papua, estimated a death toll of 3000, while the Jakarta daily, *Kompas*, reported that local rivers were so full of corpses the fish could not be eaten.⁵⁷

The Grasberg mine is jointly owned by the Indonesian government and the US mining company Freeport-McMoRan. It has the world's largest gold reserves and the world's second largest copper reserves.⁵⁸ The fact that almost none of this wealth benefits Papuans, and the considerable pollution the mine causes, have made it a flash point.⁵⁹ Very few Papuans are hired by the big mining companies, and the surrounding enterprises they support are owned and run by settlers. At the time of writing the Grasberg mine remains a site of conflict. In August 2020 Indonesian troops shot dead Hengky Wanmang, a leader of the Free Papua Organization, who was accused of leading ambushes on the mine.⁶⁰

Aside from its ore reserves, West Papua has large oil and gas deposits, which are currently being extracted by Chinese, British, and Japanese companies. Logging concessions have been granted across its rainforest. The deforested land is settled by Indonesian migrants

and used to grow food and export cash crops, especially palm oil. The global nature of extractive capitalism in West Papua suggests this modern-day colonialism should also be understood as an international, rather than simply as an Indonesian, venture. Tom Bence, the chairman of the Papuan Customary Council, has argued that 'we cannot just blame the Indonesians for colonizing us. The British and Americans are colonizing us too.'⁶¹

In 2019 a petition with 1.8 million signatures demanding an independence referendum was delivered to the UN by Benny Wenda, chairman of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua. Wenda said he hoped the United Nations would send a fact-finding mission to the province to substantiate human rights violations. 'I handed over what I call the bones of the people of West Papua', said Wenda, 'because so many people have been killed'.⁶² The following year 'Indonesians flooded public forums with the hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter'.⁶³ Yet the situation of West Papua remains almost invisible to the outside world. It is one of many examples of territories across Asia and Africa where European colonialism has not ended but been transferred to a new colonial master. Their value within extractive capitalism makes many of these would-be nations sites of intense conflict, a process that is often interlaced with ethnic and racial patterns of violence, prejudice, and marginalization.

Racist Nationalism

The assumption that the nation-state is a Western invention is central to most studies of nationalism. It has led to a set of images of the rest of the world copying and adapting but also being malformed by this foreign import. This diffusionist geo-civilizational picture is painted with too broad a brush to be credible and can be countered by reference to modernity's different routes and roots.⁶⁴ Indeed, according to some historians, a number of non-Western nations, including Korea, preceded Western ones. Duncan's study of 'proto-nationalism' in Korea finds that 'the organizational activities of the state may have created a homogeneous collectivity with a sense of shared identity much earlier than happened in the countries of Western Europe that provide the model for "modernist" scholarship'.⁶⁵ One of the benefits of complicating the timeline of nations

and nationalism is that it provokes more attention to be paid to the diversity of national 'origin myths'. As we saw in the previous section on Indonesia, the urge to find 'unity in diversity' provides one of the main political motivations of these myths. The core of this 'unity' is always problematic and has a varied relation to ethnicity. In some countries, notably multi-ethnic nations where one ethnic group has an officially defined dominance, ethnic and racial demarcations are often explicit. This was once the case in South Africa and, albeit in a less crude and cruel way, remains the case in Malaysia, where Indian and Chinese Malaysian minorities are discriminated against in many fields. 'In Malaysia we have three major races which have practically nothing in common. Their physiognomy, language, culture and religion differ', explained the country's prime minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, in 1970, adding 'Nothing makes anyone forget the fact of race.'⁶⁶

In many multi-ethnic nations no one group is formally dominant and a complex and constant negotiation of position takes place. Even though ethnicity plays a significant role in the allocation and deployment of power, this negotiation process tends to frame ethnic allegiances as highly sensitive, even taboo, topics that should not be 'stirred up' and, hence, valorizes notions of constitutional and legally enshrined unity. In this way the high hopes, often heard at the founding of newly independent nations, that the nation will be inclusive and eschew division, are both maintained and betrayed. One example of such a society is Pakistan. In a speech delivered the day after independence, in 1947, Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, warned that 'with the coming of Pakistan, a great deal of misapprehension seems to have been aroused in the hearts of many living in Pakistan. They seem to think in terms of Sindh for Sandhis and Bengal for Bengalis', but, Kahn continued, 'Pakistan is the very opposite of provincialism and racialism'.⁶⁷ In diverse countries, the hope that a new, united, nation will offer 'the very opposite' of racism is not baseless but it has been frequently disappointed. By contrast, in countries which are imagined to be ethnically homogeneous, pluralist discourse is of less political value and racism has an even more paradoxical quality, for it appears to be everywhere and nowhere, absent and present. Narratives of ethnicity, race, and racism tend to be little heard in these countries, yet the notion that 'we' are 'one race' fundamentally shapes the nation. Most supposedly homogeneous nations are very small (for example, some Pacific

island nations), but they also include large East Asia nations, notably Japan and North and South Korea.

Racist nationalism in South Korea

In a survey conducted in 1999 nearly 70 per cent of South Koreans agreed with the statement that ‘the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation’ was ‘blood’.⁶⁸ As part of his exploration of ‘ethnic nationalism’ in Korea, Gi-Wook Shin conducted his own survey and found 93 per cent of his respondents concurred with the claim that ‘Our nation has a single bloodline’.⁶⁹ In contrast to the cosmopolitan nature of late modernity identified in Europe and North America, contemporary South Korea appears to combine economic and cultural globalization with a narrative of racial homogeneity. Shin argues that

nationalism based on common blood and shared ancestry has functioned as a key mechanism to establish collectivism or a strong sense of oneness. This is said to be a key feature of Korean modernity that presents a sharp contrast to the individualism of Western modernity.⁷⁰

This unitary identity makes inclusion into Korean identity impossible for anyone deemed to be outside ‘common blood and shared ancestry’. Another survey, this time from 2020 and conducted by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea on ‘migrants living in the country’, recorded that nearly 70 per cent ‘said racism is pervasive in Korea’.⁷¹ Over recent years there have been numerous reports of hostility towards refugees and Black and Chinese people.⁷² Although, at the time of writing, South Korea has no race or ethnic discrimination legislation, there is a growing awareness of the problem and some concrete steps have been taken. For example, in 2010, the ban on ‘mixed-race’ men joining the military was lifted and, in 2011, the reference to loyalty to ‘the race’ was dropped from the oath of enlistment.⁷³

Korea was never a European colony but was annexed by Japan between 1910 and 1945. Its ‘racial nationalism’ can, in part, be explained by reference to the racialization of Korean identity that occurred in the context of European influence and Japanese colonialism. Tikhonov has explored how, from the late nineteenth century, a ‘new, race-based taxonomic system’ arrived from Europe via China

and Japan.⁷⁴ Shin writes that as ‘the first modern “ism” introduced to Korea, Social Darwinism offered an analytical framework to guide Korea’s road toward modernity’, noting that, ‘in contrast to Spencerian individualist theories’, a distinctive ‘organic and collectivist understanding’ of this ideology took hold.⁷⁵ Tikhonov suggests that imported ideas were hybridized with ‘pre-existing’ Sinocentric ‘models of the worldwide civilizational hierarchy’.

Thus, the ‘barbarians’ of the Confucian, China-centred world order evolved into the ‘savages’, ‘aborigines’, or ‘inferior races’ essential for the new *weltanschauung*. Europeans, previously classified as ‘barbarians’, were reclassified as preeminently civilized ‘White race’, while at the same time being often regarded as an existential threat, both to Koreans and other ‘Yellow’ – and generally all the non-White – people. On the other hand, the Japanese, previously seen as a troublesome, alien, and at best semicivilized neighbor, were reclassified as ‘fellow members of the Yellow race.’⁷⁶

The complex mixture of influences on Korea also shaped the emergence of racial-national resistance to Japanese colonial racism. In this way Korean racial nationalism wove together racism and resistance to racism. Thus narratives extolling the ‘unique racial origins of the Korean people’, writes Shin, bear the imprint of ‘the nationalist response to Japan’s colonial racism and assimilation policy’. These responses emphasized that Korea was ‘an organic body formed out of the spirit of a people ... descended from a single blood line’, an origin myth that offers a sense of uniqueness and harmony and retains considerable currency in the context of globalization and westernization.⁷⁷ As this implies, although there are signs that South Korea is on the path to a more multicultural form of nationalism, notions of unity and purity do not simply ‘hang on’ from the past but are actively reproduced within Korean modernity.

All of the Above? The Intersection of Capitalism, Socialism, Nationalism, and Religion in Apartheid South Africa

Apartheid (Afrikaans for ‘apartness’) was a system of racial hierarchy, separation, and categorization that was in place in South Africa between 1948 and 1991. The term has since become used for a variety of systems of ethno-racial subjugation and has entered international

law, being defined by the International Criminal Court as an 'institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime'.⁷⁸

This chapter has charted communist, capitalist, and nationalist routes and roots of racist modernity. However, as I indicated in the discussion of Indonesia, these forms may, in practice, be woven together. In this final section I turn to apartheid South Africa, to explore these intersections. The South African case points us not only towards a simple combination of forms but to their integration within an overarching ideology of White supremacism. Apartheid South Africa was governed by the National Party, an Afrikaners ethno-nationalist party that was part of an international network of right-wings, authoritarian regimes. Its allies included the Portuguese dictatorship, Pinochet in Chile, and Stroessner in Paraguay. As Furlong notes, these 'ties partly reflected a pariahs' alliance, but there was also a shared "right-wing" focus on anti-Communism, crushing dissent, and preserving control by a conservative privileged minority'.⁷⁹ In South Africa, conservative Christian religiosity also infused and shaped an Afrikaners/White racial-national origin myth. This myth positioned the Afrikaners as a 'Chosen People' who had a divine right and duty to rule the land. Tiryakian explains that 'the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination combined with a belief in the curse on the children of Ham led to an interesting dichotomization of the world' into the Whites and the Blacks, the former 'the elect of God', the latter 'Damned by their black skins'.⁸⁰ Dubow, who also brings out the importance of the churches, notably the Dutch Reformed Church, in the ideological statecraft of apartheid, depicts apartheid as a form of 'Christian-nationalism', which mixed biological with religious forms of racism and 'proved flexible and eclectic in its use of racist ideas'.⁸¹

In religious contexts the language of racism could be opaque, but it was brutally explicit in the organization and policing of daily life, dictating almost every aspect of ordinary existence. In this sense, apartheid South Africa can appear unique, even freakish, for no other country in the second half of the twentieth century had such an overt and elaborate bureaucracy of racism. Yet it can also be understood as indicative of a wider landscape of 'racial capitalism'. South Africans today, writes Livermon, are still living with racial injustice and know that 'racial capitalism and its attendant forms of management are

global concerns that plague much of the black world'.⁸² The first use of the term 'racial capitalism' appears to have been to depict apartheid. Martin Legassick and David Henson elaborated the term in 1976 in order to position apartheid South Africa within a wider, international economy of capitalist exploitation. Thus they explained that 'foreign investment in South Africa is critical for capital accumulation both in the giving countries and in the receiving country'. They pointed to South Africa's most important economic sector, mining, to detail how the racist management of labour mobility and residence was integral to profit taking: 'Segregation was the means whereby the economic interests of the mining industry were constituted as state policy', Legassick and Henson wrote, detailing that segregation meant that 'the African labour force' was maintained as a low-wage and expendable army of recruits, 'who would continue to engage in household peasant production (in ever declining amounts) which would subsidise its wages'.⁸³

The international market in South African minerals sustained, shaped, and helps explain the apartheid state. However, apartheid had a complex relationship to capitalism. Apartheid was a highly state-centric, interventionist ideology, with extensive welfare and control mechanisms, so much so that it has sometimes been depicted as the antithesis of capitalism. Thus, for Williams, the 'whole ugly history of apartheid has been an attack on free markets and the rights of individuals, a glorification of centralized government power'.⁸⁴ Although it is not plausible to depict apartheid as 'anti-capitalist', there is something missing from attempts to read it as simply serving the interests of capital. At the centre of apartheid was White supremacism, an ideology created and curated by a statist-capitalist regime. The administrative and bureaucratic zeal of this distinctive form of racist modernity has been analysed by Deborah Posel, who calls attention to the regime's combination of 'strident ideological zeal' and 'assertive rationalism'. She is referring, specifically, to apartheid governments' efforts to demarcate, classify, and study their racialized subjects: 'an energetic process within the state of reconstituting the standards and benchmarks of good governance in an efficient, modern state'. Thus the regime sought out anthropological and statistical expertise and information to create data-led governance. For Posel what distinguished apartheid was its 'modernist confidence in the powers of the central state as an agent of large-scale social transformation', a confidence that was combined with an

aggressive, thorough-going commitment to white supremacy – in a form compatible with the renewal of white economic prosperity ... The apartheid version of a ‘modern’ state was one which was sufficiently large, powerful and centrally co-ordinated to keep each ‘race’ in its ‘proper’ place, economically, politically and socially.⁸⁵

Posel’s account is convincing but also suggestive of international comparisons. As we have seen, apartheid South Africa is not the only country where ‘races’ are kept in their ‘proper’ place. However, such comparisons should not be misused or misread to suggest that White supremacism is ‘just another’ racist ideology. As I show in the next chapter, whiteness is a uniquely global ideology and globalization is giving it a new lease of life.

Further Reading

Ian Law, *Red Racisms: Racism in Communist and Post-communist Contexts* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).

An original analysis of the development and particularity of racism under various communist regimes, including in Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. Law’s study shows that ‘red racism’ was not simply a throwback to pre-revolutionary traditions but a product of communist modernity’s own exclusionary dynamics.

Amy Chau, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (London: William Heinemann, 2003).

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Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). The racialization that accompanied Japanese colonization and Korean national self-racialization are detailed with clarity and thoroughness in this important work, which is a leading example of a new wave of critical literature tackling issues of nation, belonging, and identity in South Korea.

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